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Abstract: Perhaps the biggest disconnect between philosophers and non-philosophers on gun rights 
is over the importance of arms to our dignitary interests. This essay argues that we have a strong 
prima facie moral right to resist with dignity and that (with certain qualifications) violent resistance is 
more dignified than nonviolent resistance. Since in some cases dignified resistance will require 
violence, and since effective violent resistance will sometimes require guns, we have a strong prima 
facie right to own or carry guns if they are necessary often enough for effective dignified resistance. 
Since this right holds (to some degree) even when nonviolent means would better achieve the 
security aims of potential victims, the bar for justifying gun rights is lower than commonly assumed.   
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1. Introduction 
Philosophers on both sides of the gun control debate typically assume that a moral right to guns is 
contingent on whether guns make us individually or collectively safer.1 For instance, Hugh 
LaFollette held that, “[g]iven the negative results of private gun ownership, gun advocates should 
show not only that guns deter crime, but that they are the best way of doing so.”2 And in his pro-
gun reply, Samuel Wheeler argued   
not that guns are one among several means to protecting oneself . . . but that guns are the 
only currently practicable means. That a gun is the only practicable means in some situations 
generates a prima facie entitlement to have a gun.3 (emphasis in the original) 
 
                                                 
1 In addition to those philosophers discussed in the text, Michael Huemer (“Is There a Right to Own a Gun?” Social 
Theory and Practice (2003) 29.2: 297-324) has argued that we have a freedom-based right to guns even if they collectively 
make us less safe, and that the strength of this right is based on the recreational and security interests of gun owners—
no mention is made of dignity. 
2 Hugh LaFollette, “Gun Control,” Ethics 110 (2000): 278. 
3 Samuel Wheeler, “Gun Violence and Fundamental Rights,” Criminal Justice Ethics 20.1 (2001): 21-22. 
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Recently, Jeff McMahon asserted that the empirical premise gun advocates must defend is that 
“members of society as a whole are safer when more of them have guns.”4 David DeGrazia 
concludes that the empirical evidence suggests handgun ownership is on average self-defeating 
because it increases net risk for the owner,5 while gun rights advocate Timothy Hsiao argues that 
“[e]ven though guns may lead to more overall social harm, there remain certain persons for whom 
gun ownership would be effective at stopping or preventing crime.”6  
Whether guns make us safer or best achieve our security aims are important questions. But 
whether and when armed resistance is our only dignified option is also an important variable. 
Victims of assault, invasion, or oppression have a strong prima facie moral right to resist with 
dignity, and dignity sometimes demands armed violence even when nonviolence would achieve 
victims’ ends more easily or safely.7 Generally speaking, if we have an overarching right to live with 
dignity, then we have a moral right to buy or even carry guns if dignified resistance is likely enough 
to require them. Precisely how likely is “likely enough,” and whether or where, in the real world, that 
threshold has been met, are the critical questions in a gun rights debate that takes dignity seriously.8 
2. Dignity’s relevance to self-defense 
In 2013, during a statewide debate on whether guns should be allowed on campuses, the 
Department of Public Safety at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) published a 
memo advising students to vomit or urinate on themselves if sexually assaulted. Although the memo 
                                                 
4 Jeff McMahon, “A Challenge to Gun Rights,” Oxford University’s Practical Ethics blog (April 17, 2015), available: 
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/04/a-challenge-to-gun-rights.  
5 David DeGrazia, “Handguns, Moral Rights, and Physical Security,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11.1 (2014): 1-21.  
6 Timothy Hsaio, “Against Gun Bans and Restrictive Licensing,” Essays in Philosophy 16.2 (2015): 188. 
7 This thesis has obvious implications for just war theory’s “reasonable success” condition, but I cannot broach that 
consequence in detail here. See Frances Harbour, “Reasonable Probability of Success as a Moral Criterion in the 
Western Just War Tradition,” Journal of Military Ethics 10.3 (2011): 230-241. 
8 My position should be termed a “dignitarian” one, but “dignitarian” is loaded with theoretical baggage and substantive 
positions that are at best irrelevant to the points of this essay. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
3 
 
also endorsed “hitting or biting,” it cautioned that “some actions [presumably, the violent ones] on 
your part may lead to more harm” and that “if your life is in danger, passive resistance may be your 
best defense.”9 As could be expected, right-wing pundits promptly criticized the memo’s 
recommendations as ineffective, infantilizing, and condescending.10 But even feminist and 
progressive commentators found the advice distasteful.11 UCCS, friendless on the issue and hoping 
to avoid more bad press, pulled the offending webpage within days. Their infamous advice has 
nonetheless become a fixture of the gun rights memeplex.12  
Ironically, UCCS’s recommendations were not idiosyncratic in the self-defense community. 
The book See Sally Kick Ass: A Woman’s Guide to Personal Safety, for instance, counsels that attacked 
women, among other things, rub vomit or feces all over their bodies, as does Fight Back! Safety and 
Self-Defense Tips, which also advises acting crazy and barking like a dog.13 The contrast between the 
titles of these books and their advice is noteworthy: why weren’t they titled Bark Like a Dog! or 
worse, See Sally Rub Shit on Herself, if such tactics are sound? The simple answer is that these 
unsavory methods of self-defense were downplayed because they are undignified.  
I begin with these examples of degrading resistance because our response to them has 
nothing to do with primitive honor culture14 or macho frontier individualism15—psychological 
impulses which, although real enough, are often used in progressive and academic forums to 
discount arguments of gun rights advocates. The intuition that covering ourselves with egesta would 
                                                 
9 Alyssa Newcomb, “Colorado College Advises Students to Urinate, Vomit to Stop Rapists,” ABC News (Feb 20, 2013). 
10 Michelle Malkin, “The Anti-Choice Left’s Disarming of the American Woman,” MichelleMalkin.com (Feb 20, 2013).  
11 Katie Baker, “College Tells Women to Avoid Rape By Peeing, Vomiting, and Menstruating on Command,” Jezabel.com, 
Feb 21, 2013. 
12 See https://highheelsandhandguns.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/screen-shot-2014-05-19-at-9-44-00-pm.png?w=640. 
13 Fred Vogt, See Sally Kick Ass: A Woman’s Guide to Personal Safety (Denver: Outskirts Press, 2006), 108; Gina Marie 
Rivera, Fight Back! Safety and Self-Defense Tips (Lulu.com, 2012), 3. 
14 Dov Cohen, “Self-Protection and the Culture of Honor: Explaining Southern Violence,” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 20.5 (1994): 551-567. 
15 Dan Baum, “On Gun Control and the Great American Debate Over Individualism,” Harper’s (May 17, 2013), 
available: http://harpers.org/blog/2013/05/on-gun-control-and-the-great-american-debate-over-individualism/. 
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be an undignified self-defense measure appears to be shared across the political spectrum, so we can 
say with confidence that defense with dignity matters to a wide and diverse swath of readers.  
In fact, as has been noted by SCOTUS justices and legal commentators on both the political 
right and left, dignity cannot inform disability rights, women’s rights, and gay rights but not self-
defense rights. Writes legal theorist Jeffrey Rosen, 
[D]own the line, the right to dignity—now celebrated by liberals for what it means to gay 
rights—could ultimately produce other decisions in unrelated cases that they would not be 
so quick to celebrate. In the McDonald case, striking down gun possession laws under the 
Second Amendment, Justice Scalia recognized a dignitary interest attached to the right to 
bear arms. “[T]he conceptual core of the liberty clause . . . pertains to . . . [an individual’s] 
[s]elf-determination, . . . dignity [or] respect,” he wrote.16 
 
To sharpen this point, let us draw upon our intuitions about disability with dignity for a moment. 
Suppose your local magistrate decided to assist wheelchair-bound individuals by hiring powerful 
bailiffs to carry them up the courthouse steps. There is little doubt that being cradled in a court 
officer’s beefy embrace would require less effort than wheeling oneself up a ramp. It would probably 
be more comfortable and make the ascent quicker. Some disabled people might prefer it. But 
disabled people have a right to use ramps if they prefer to, and it would be outrageous to replace the 
more onerous but more dignified ramp option with bailiffs. Generally, disabled people have a right 
to dignified accessible technologies even when undignified measures would be more efficient, 
practicable, or convenient. Likewise, those who are likely enough to require weapons to resist with 
dignity have a moral right to them, even if weapons are less effective or safe than their alternatives. 
3. Is violent resistance more dignified than nonviolent resistance? 
As the UCCS example shows, nonviolent resistance is sometimes undignified. But can we say 
anything more general about the relationship between violent resistance and dignity? I think so: in 
this section I motivate the view that (given a few provisos) violent resistance is generally more 
                                                 
16 Jeffrey Rosen, “The Dangers of a Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity,’ Atlantic (Apr 29, 2015), available: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-doctrine-of-dignity/391796/. 
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dignified than nonviolent resistance. So although violent resistance isn’t always our only dignified 
option, we shouldn’t be surprised that it often is.  
Rubbing excrement over oneself to discourage a rapist exemplifies what I call a “repellence” 
strategy. Repellence strategies are abundant in nature: poison dart frogs, for example, secrete toxins 
that sicken their would-be predators. Although nonviolent, repellence is distinct from passive 
resistance. Passive resistance campaigns, such as those led by Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther 
King, Jr., are usually designed to spotlight injustice, to elicit solidarity from dominant groups, and to 
disrupt the smooth operation of oppressive regimes. Politically, passive resistance strives to make 
the victimized groups attractive or sympathetic, not repellent. Practically, repellence differs from 
passive resistance by being potentially excruciating or even deadly for assailants who fail to desist. A 
poison dart frog’s toxic ooze can unexpectedly harm a predator in ways that an armadillo’s armored 
shell cannot. Nonetheless repellence isn’t what we’d normally call “violent”: without committing to a 
theory of what violence is, repellence doesn’t involve fighting back.  
Both repellence and passive resistance can be dignified. Activating a blaring alarm or 
releasing a cloud of tear gas would be repellent and yet reasonably dignified methods of resisting 
attack in some cases. Also by way of concession, violent resistance can certainly be undignified. 
Disproportionate, inapt, and awkward responses strike me as always undignified. For instance, in 
resisting a bratty child who occasionally kicks you in the shins, dignity would rule out blasting him 
with a shotgun (disproportionate) or holding a hunger strike (inapt). Awkward performances can 
also render violent resistance undignified: even if he is morally in the right, a drunken man’s efforts 
to fight off an assailant in the pub parking lot is more likely to be cringeworthy than dignified.  
That said, when proportionate, apt, and adroit, violent resistance appears to be a more 
dignified form of resistance than its (proportionate, apt, and adroit) nonviolent alternatives. Just as 
we say horses are big only if we ignore elephants, the dignity of nonviolent resistance is dwarfed by 
6 
 
the dignity of proportionate, apt, and adroit violent resistance. For instance, the most dignified 
instance of passive resistance I know of occurred in 1930 when, in protest of the British salt tax, 
over 2000 Indian men lined up in rows to symbolically “raid” the Dharasana Saltworks (an event 
memorably dramatized in the film Gandhi). Like most people, I am astonished by the self-possession 
and courage of the Dharasana Saltworks “raiders.” And yet, although the raid was supremely 
dignified given its actual historical context, it seems equally clear that its dignity was contingent upon 
the protestors’ inability to violently expel their British overlords. For suppose those hundreds of 
millions of Indians suddenly and magically received the guns and training necessary to forcefully 
liberate themselves. What would we say of the Dharasana “raid” then? Wouldn’t we consider it a 
perplexingly demeaning effort, however stoical? Far more dignified in this hypothetically armed 
India would be an ultimatum to the British giving them one month to remove themselves before 
being forcibly expelled: a proportionate, apt, adroit—but hardly heroic—violent threat.   
4. What makes violent resistance more dignified? 
What is it about proportionate, apt, and adroit violence that ennobles resistance? One possibility is 
that violent resistance claims a type of equality that is highly relevant to dignity: namely, that unlike 
passive and repellent resistance, violent resistance asserts the victim’s personhood by refusing to 
grant the victimizer full discretion over the terms of engagement. If Jill passively resists the 
attempted rapist Jack (say, like an armadillo, she tucks into the world’s most effective fetal position), 
Jack gets to determine when the episode is over. Even if Jill makes herself repellent (say, by 
evacuating her bowls), Jack nonetheless gets to decide when to break off the disagreeable attack and 
go about his business. But if Jill responds violently, then Jack no longer calls the shots on whether 
the engagement will continue or what consequences he will suffer. Upon putting up a fight, Jill 
makes Jack’s challenge game theoretic, not decision theoretic: Jill as it were transforms herself from 
an inert feature of Jack’s landscape into an agent who helps shape Jack’s world, just as Jack has 
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helped shaped hers. (This explanation is reminiscent of classical republican thoughts about why 
voting and legal rights are especially important to dignity.17)  
Although we wish Jill success, in reality, as the self-defense experts cited above point out, 
violent resistance is often ineffective and results in even more harm for the victim. The ubiquity of 
passive and repellent resistance in nature, along with strong freeze and flight instincts even in 
creatures who sometimes do fight back, proves that violent resistance is often a losing strategy. But 
we are talking about a moral relation between aggressor and victim, not a descriptive one. Only by 
fighting back do victims claim their moral equality in the engagements their aggressors summon into 
existence. 
But one needn’t accept my speculations on the superior dignity of violent resistance to 
recognize that we have a right to defend ourselves in dignified ways. Clearly we have right to live 
with dignity, and any number of everyday instances of assault, invasion, or oppression can be 
provided demonstrating (for anyone capable of intuitions about dignity) that sometimes our only 
dignified options will be violent. 
5. From dignified resistance to guns 
How might our right to dignified resistance inform the gun rights debate? Even if in the above 
scenario Jill has a dignity right to violently resist Jack, she has a wide range of morally permissible 
violent options. She may scratch, punch, or bite him, as the UCCS memo notes. Jill’s mere right to 
defend herself violently doesn’t entail a moral right to own, carry, or use a gun. So dignity-based gun 
rights advocacy must show that our right to defense with dignity extends to effective violent 
resistance, and that effective dignified violent resistance “likely-enough” requires arms.  
                                                 
17 The dignity of being non-dominated on the individual level—of being such that someone cannot offend against you 
with impunity—the classical republican conception of political freedom writ small. See e.g. Philip Pettit, “Freedom with 
Honor: A Republican Ideal,” Social Research 64.1 (1997): 52-76. 
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The simplest argument for effective dignified violent resistance is based on the principle 
that, if one has a right to x, one has a right to an effective x. If a prisoner has a right to water, he has 
a right to healthy water; if a child has a right to an education, she has a right to decent teachers. 
Likewise, if we have a right to dignified self-defense, and if dignity in certain cases requires violence, 
then we have a right to effective violent resistance in those circumstances, too. Disability again 
provides us with an instructive analogy. Consider the circumstance of a disabled man—let’s call him 
Raj—recently photographed struggling to ascend the stairs of a non-handicapped-accessible subway 
terminal in New Delhi.18 Raj’s determination in the face of hardship, his strength of spirit, and his 
refusal to give up make his climb very dignified indeed. And yet, the fact that Raj’s ascent is dignified 
without access to a wheelchair and ramp in no way undermines his right to procure these assistive 
technologies. Similarly, the fact that we can resist assault, invasion, and oppression with dignity even 
if deprived of the guns which would make our resistance effective doesn’t entail that we don’t have a 
right to guns. Furthermore, since assistive technologies give the disabled more independence and 
thus (all things being equal) a more dignified life, a legal prohibition of wheelchairs and ramps would 
itself be an indignity. The same might be said of gun control laws aimed at separating weapons from 
people who require guns to resist effectively and with dignity.  
6. Does dignity justify putting innocent third parties at risk? 
Even if we have a dignity-right to guns whether or not they make us less safe, there is some limit to 
how unsafe they may be for innocent others and yet morally permissible for us to own or carry. I 
suggest that the dignity-based reply to concern for innocent third parties should, once again, be 
premised on simple consistency across domains.  
                                                 
18 Photo by Sushil Kumar Verma, titled “Indomitable Spirit” by The Hindu (July 13, 2013), available: 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/indomitable-spirit/article4910845.ece. 
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Suppose Simone, a single mother earning low wages as a waitress, is raising her children in 
an impoverished and dangerous neighborhood. Suppose further that her looks would allow her to 
earn more money as a sex worker: a great deal more if she took up prostitution, but still considerably 
more if she simply became a “cam girl,” which, given that she’d be working at home and for herself, 
would also afford her more safety and autonomy than waitressing. Simone realizes all this on an 
intellectual level, but she never considers sex work because (correctly or not) she sees sex work as 
demeaning. So Simone’s refusal to become a sex worker places her children at peril for the sake of 
her dignity. It is implausible that Simone may put her children at risk for the sake of her (perceived, 
and quite possibly misplaced) sexual dignity but not for the sake of her dignity in matters of self-
defense or resistance. Estimate for yourself how much danger Simone may put her children in for 
the sake of her sexual dignity: even after multiplying by relevant probabilities (after all, Simone’s 
“indignity” would be certain if she took up sex work, but there is only a chance that she may need a 
gun for dignified resistance), the result may well be that the maximum risk she may impose on her 
children for the sake of her sexual dignity on your calculus is higher than the risk imposed on many 
children when their parents own or carry guns.   
7. Conclusion: determining and exercising our dignity-right to guns  
Since, as in other matters, we have a prima facie right to dignity in self-defense and resistance, if 
guns are required often enough to resist with dignity, we have a prima facie moral right to them even 
if it is discovered that armed resistance is less effective or more dangerous than passive or repellent 
alternatives such as alarm systems, small but alert guard dogs, walking in groups, protest marches, 
strikes, etc. Nonetheless, given the risks guns pose for innocent third parties, the prospect of 
needing arms to resist with dignity must be “likely-enough” to justify owning or carrying them. No 
legal freedoms could make it morally permissible to endanger innocent people with our arms if the 
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chances are miniscule that our dignity will require them. Since dignity considerations alone cannot 
justify our right to own or carry certain things (such as teddy bears), a uniquely dignity-based defense 
of gun rights would need to make plausible the idea that guns are reasonably necessary for a 
dignified life. In this way the dignity-based rationale sets a higher bar for gun rights than a libertarian 
one that sees simple freedom as grounding a prima facie right to possess or carry guns (or teddy 
bears, for that matter).19    
Determining how often dignity requires armed resistance is a research agenda with social-
scientific and ethical dimensions. As far as crime is concerned, we would need to consider cases—
more practically, types of crimes, such as home invasions, carjackings, sexual assaults, street 
robberies, etc.—and rely on our sense of dignity to determine whether victims in these (types of) 
situations require guns to defend themselves effectively and with dignity. We would then need to 
multiply those results by the probability of these situations actually occurring. The results may well 
show that some of us have no right, or at least no right we may morally exercise, to carry or even 
own a gun. My current home is in such a safe (and highly-armed, I might add) town that I cannot, as 
a father of two young children, purchase a gun in good conscience, let alone carry one around. But 
many people, especially those who live in violent neighborhoods or who are likely targets of attack, 
may well have an undefeated dignity-right to guns. 
                                                 
19 Nonetheless, a dignity-based defense of gun rights can be compatible with a libertarian one. 
